

Words To Be Remembered As The Peace Talks Start

I consider peace more important than territory. The area we had before the Six-Day War would be enough to take in all the Jews. For peace, I would be for giving back all the captured areas, with the exception of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

—David Ben-Gurion, interviewed in the June 1 Time Magazine.

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Golda Meir and God's Cruel Prank

This year, happily, the guns of August were stilled. It would be a crime against humanity if they were allowed to blaze up again this fall. It would also be a disaster for both branches of the Semitic people. The extremists on either side are mad if they think they can attain their aims by war. Al Fatah's dream of destroying the Jewish State cannot be accomplished. It would end only in a new holocaust, this time for Jew and Arab alike, and it would be a miracle if the flames did not engulf the world. Equally foolish are those Israelis who think they can go on for another generation besieged and dependent on an ever more frantic and costly effort to maintain air superiority. A fourth of Israel's gross national product and 85% of her taxes are already going to defense. In the tense and clamorous weeks ahead the one essential point should not be lost to sight. The international climate, and particularly the relations between the two superpowers, have unexpectedly provided a precious opportunity in which it may be possible at last to guarantee the existence of Israel and to construct a Palestinian State in which Arab refugees may be helped to build a new life. That opportunity must not be lost.

The Need For Speed

Two steps are urgent. One is to set up some joint system of inspection which will deal quickly with the charges of cease-fire violation. The other is to speed up the Jarring mission by making the Arabs spell out just how they are prepared to recognize Israel and its rights in a settlement and at the same time making the Israelis spell out just how and where they are prepared to withdraw. When parallel discussions have forced both sides to begin putting their cards on the table, it will then be the task of the UN and the superpowers to pare down the positions of both sides so they will fit into the framework of the 1967 Security Council resolution. The faster this is done the better. Contending peoples who haven't agreed in 3,000 years are not going to come to terms in 30 days. Basically the agreement will have to be imposed, as the cease-fire itself was imposed.

In a real sense the coerced agreement to begin talks may be seen not so much as an imposition by the big powers as a liberation of Israeli and Arab politics from sacrosanct but stale rigidities. What had long been deemed politically impossible turned out to be politically popular. The war weary people on both sides greeted news of the cease-fire with relief. The big powers have not only isolated the extremists but unleashed hopes for peace which make it more difficult for the leadership to turn back from negotiations.

For many years here and in Israel I have heard it said that Nasser alone among the Arab rulers was strong enough some day to make peace with Israel. Now that this day seems precariously to be dawning, Israeli leaders are unwilling to acknowledge what is happening. It took courage for Nasser to accept the U.S. proposal, and Israel has already reaped political divi-

Why Not An Imposed Solution?

Because the conflict is a threat to the outside world, it cannot be left solely to the humors of the belligerents. I have never fully understood why some of our statesmen feel that it would be a heinous crime for external parties to "impose" a solution. Under the United Nations Charter the Security Council has full authority—possibly even the obligation—to impose a settlement upon warring parties who fail to make peace on their own. The very premise of the Charter is that warring nations can no longer be permitted immunity from a world police power....

As to the Arabs and Israelis, they too are signatories to the Charter and no one can say they have been denied a fair opportunity to settle their differences peacefully and on their own. They might now be reminded of their commitment under Article 25 of the Charter, which states that "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

I think it would be a fine thing—a useful step forward for civilization—if, in the absence of a voluntary settlement by the parties, the United Nations were to "impose" a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. It would be an equally fine thing if the United Nations could "impose" a settlement in Southeast Asia.

—Fulbright on the Middle East, August 23.

dends from his action. Arab unity has been shattered. The ranks of the fedayeen are split. Nasser shut down the radio facilities of the guerrillas in Cairo and they may lose their subsidies from Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait, all of which have accepted the cease-fire. *El Fath* has termed the talks a crime. What better earnest could Nasser and Hussein give of their sincerity? Would Israel prefer Arab unity and continuation of the war?

In a period of world-wide detente, the Israeli leadership is in danger of becoming the last stronghold of the cold war. The joint moves toward a Middle Eastern settlement are part of a larger trend. When West Germany and Moscow make peace, when Moscow embraces the hated Social Democrats and *revanchards* of yesterday, when Bonn accepts the Oder-Neisse line, and Washington acquiesces, we are in a new period of history. If Germans and Russians can agree, why not Arab and Israeli? The Israeli leadership finds it hard to adjust to this. As recently as July 20 Mrs. Meir in an interview with the German weekly *Der Spiegel* suggested that NATO and the U.S. should force the Russians out of the Middle East in a confrontation like that of the Cuban missile crisis!

The basic trouble between the Israeli government and the Nixon Administration is that Nixon is becoming too much of

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a dove to suit Jerusalem's taste. The Israeli government hoped for confrontation, and Nixon seems set on negotiation. The divergence extends beyond the question of Soviet relations. The Israeli government for some time has sought to polarize the situation, to push the Arab states so completely into the arms of Moscow that Israel would become the one firm friend of the U.S. in the Middle East. This would assure U.S. support in a continuous arms race. "Do you think President Nixon's era of negotiation with the Soviet Union," Mrs. Meir was asked on CBS *Face The Nation* August 30, "is reacting to Israel's disadvantage?" Mrs. Meir dodged the question with a lengthy answer to a previous inquiry. The recent suggestion from San Clemente of joint Soviet-American teams to safeguard the new borders must have alarmed the Israeli government because it fears great power collaboration. But what kind of security would Israel have if the cold war intensified and grew hot in the Middle East?

The Background Of Oil

U.S. policy is to save U.S. interests in Egypt and the Middle East by bringing about a settlement. The oil companies which draw \$2 billion a year for the U.S. balance of payments from the Middle East and have a growing investment in Egypt want peace. If the price of that settlement, realistically, is a kind of superpower partnership in enforcing the peace, the oil companies are prepared to pay it. So is Nixon. I myself believe this is to Israel's interest, and that it is far better for Israel if the Arab states are not completely dependent on Moscow and if the U.S. maintains sufficient leverage on both sides for peace.

Fulbright sees the conjuncture of forces as providing an ideal opportunity not only for peace in the Middle East but to revive the United Nations. His speech of last week on the Middle East, from which we present excerpts in these pages, gives Nixon and Rogers valuable help. From all indications the Nixon Administration has been giving Israel assurance of new safeguards if it goes along with a settlement within the framework of the 1967 UN resolution. Nixon's hand is strengthened when Fulbright, the leading foe of America's effort to be a world policeman, declares his readiness in this case to support a U.S. treaty underwriting a UN settlement and guaranteeing Israel's security. Three fourths of the Senate in two open letters to Nixon in the past two months have put their names to hawkish declarations of support for confrontation in

Not A Substitute For Negotiations

Sen. Percy: By the distinguished Senator's proposal did he wish to remove from the area of negotiation the possibility that the belligerent parties themselves might agree that it makes sense for Israel to retain small areas which have no great value economically but which strategically may give great assurance to the people?

Sen. Fulbright: Of course not. If the parties agree to that, I would welcome it. In anticipation that they may not, I simply suggested as an alternative that the Security Council undertake to station United Nations troops at those critical areas.

Sen. Percy: In other words, just on the eve of talks, it is not the Senator's intention to remove the initiative from the parties themselves or to impose from the outside the details of an arrangement or settlement on the parties themselves.

Sen. Fulbright: Not at all.

Sen. Percy: They could work out these details.

Sen. Fulbright: The only reason for that is that, as the Senator knows, this has been going on for a long time, and they have been unable to work out the details. It would be much more acceptable if the parties themselves could work it out. It is only as a last resort, in recognition of the danger of this to us, that I make this proposal—on the theory that these proposals, if they are taken seriously, might be a further incentive for the parties to work it out.

—Senate discussion of the Fulbright Speech, August 24.

the Middle East and new arms shipments to Israel. Fulbright's speech on the other hand provides support for negotiation rather than confrontation. This accounts for the sour response it received in hawkish and Israeli quarters.

The Fulbright speech, in its humanity, its idealism and its concern for both Arab and Jewish rights and susceptibilities, is one of the greatest he ever delivered.* But we must confess considerable misgiving about a security treaty between the U.S. and Israel. History too often has seen such relationships begin in benevolence and end in imperialism. It would create serious risks for both America and Israel, and the Israeli reactions indi-

* It deserves a full and careful reading. The text may be obtained by writing the Senator at the New Senate Office Building in Washington. The text as printed in the *New York Times* Aug. 23 was truncated and much of value omitted.

Geopolitical Myths Which Convert A Regional Conflict Into A Cold War Battleground

As if the Arab-Israeli problem were not enough, the great powers have made their own special contribution to the mythology of the Middle East by infusing the crisis with the *hocus pocus* of geopolitics. The Middle East, in geopolitical terms, is something far more abstract than an oil-rich desert contested by feuding Semitic people. Beyond that, it is the "gateway to the East," the "hinge of NATO," and the crucial cockpit of the historic Russian drive toward warm water. By sending planes and missiles to Egypt the Russians are not merely bolstering a shaky client; to the x-ray eyes of the geopolitician, they are embarked upon a drive to convert the Mediterranean into a "Soviet lake." The concept is admittedly vague: would the Russians close the Mediterranean to foreign shipping? prohibit fishing? use it as a vacation resort? . . .

When ideological and moral pronouncements are set aside—as every now and then honesty commands—the American perspective on the Middle East is in a number of important respects the mirror image of that of the Russians. We too attach great importance to our fleet plying Mediterranean waters; we too have an economic stake in the region—though not as great as that of some of our allies, who get

most of their oil from the Middle East; we too derive ego-gratification from wielding "influence" in various parts of the world—although, like the Russians, we prefer to dress up our egoism in unctuous pieties; and, like our rival, we are a pushover for geopolitical grandiosities . . .

Only in one respect is our interest in the Middle East fundamentally different from that of other outside powers: we are tied to Israel by bonds of culture and sentiment and by the special attachment of our American Jewish population. These bonds represent a perfectly valid basis for the definition of a "national interest" and for the making of a valid commitment based on that interest—provided that the commitment is made in an appropriately constitutional manner, and provided too that it does not infringe upon or derogate from other valid interests. As matters now stand our commitment to Israel is *de facto* and undefined: we do not really know the extent of our obligation, which could be very great, while Israel does not know what in the way of American support she can rely on. This uncertainty in turn appears to have driven Israel to greater militancy and inflexibility in her attitude toward the Arabs.

—Fulbright on the Middle East, August 23.

cate that they also are doubtful. Israel's security would be better served by strengthening the United Nations and solidifying the world detente. Her long range future depends on her becoming an accepted part of a Semitic Middle East, not an outpost of any superpower. But Fulbright's suggestion, even if it never materializes in a treaty, must give added assurance to Israel that the U.S. will not let her down in a peace settlement. A consensus which extends from Nixon to Fulbright is more assurance than any treaty.

This Time The Arabs Stayed

The peace talks flow from the carefully drawn Nov. 22, 1967, resolution of the Security Council. Its cornerstone is "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." The principle is important from the standpoint of world law and its reconciliation with Israeli security needs is not as difficult as may appear at first glance. The problem is eased first of all because the bulk of the inhabited areas taken over by the Israelis in the 1967 war are occupied territories in a double sense. They are occupied by Israeli forces but they are also occupied by Arabs. That occupation is an obstacle to Israeli annexation. The Gaza strip is jammed with refugees from the 1948 and 1956 wars. On the West Bank this time the Arabs did not flee or let themselves be frightened into flight. Gaza and the West Bank together have so many Arabs that their annexation would at once create the binational State which majority Zionist opinion has opposed and—given the higher Arab birthrate—would threaten soon to create what Al Fatah seeks: a Palestine with an Arab majority. The only way to preserve a Jewish state is to relinquish those territories.

This leaves three genuine security problems: the Golan Heights, from which Jewish settlements in the Jordan valley were so long shelled by Arab guerrillas; Sharm El Sheikh, which guards the Tiran straits and Israel's access to the Red Sea; and Latrun, which protects the vital road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Some form of demilitarization and international force should be a feasible compromise at the first two points. According to the able Israeli journalist, Victor Cygielman, in

Trading One Insecure Frontier For Another

Surrounded by hostile neighbors, holding down occupied lands inhabited by a million Arabs, plagued by fedayeen attacks and oppressed by the costs of armament, Israel is a desperately insecure nation. That is clear, but it is anything but clear that her present policy of relying on military superiority is ever going to alter the situation. If the Suez frontier does not provide security, what boundaries would? . . . Israel will be secure when and if the Arabs lose the wish to threaten her. Eliminating that wish should be an object worth pursuing from Israel's point of view. As victors the Israelis are in a position to be magnanimous without being suspected of weakness—which is something nations worry about whenever they are thinking of behaving sensibly. But thus far they have shown little inclination to trade their conquests for peace. Instead they cling to the advantages won by their military victory of 1967, a wasting asset. One insecure frontier has been traded for another and all that the future seems to hold is continuing conflict, as threatening to the outside world as it is to the Arabs and Israelis.

—Fulbright on the Middle East Aug. 23.

Le Nouvel Observateur (Aug. 24), the U.S. would not be opposed to rectification of the old Israel-Jordan frontier at Latrun (and the retention by Israel of Kfar Etzion in the hills to the North) if Israel is ready to cede a territory of the same extent to Jordan in a peace settlement. Cygielman reported that Israel was disposed to cede the region of Oum-el-Fakham which is inhabited by Israeli Arabs.

This leaves the problem of Jerusalem. Cygielman says the Rogers proposals would demilitarize Jerusalem, leave the city united but with Israeli police and municipal authorities in the Jewish section and Arab authorities in the Arab. There would be a common council for Greater Jerusalem representing both sides with free access to the Holy Places guaranteed for all. There is no reason why Jerusalem under some such ingenious

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The Dirty Deal The Army Gives The Draftee in Southeast Asia Finally Revealed

Army draftees were killed in Vietnam last year at nearly double the rate of non-draftee enlisted men. During 1969, Army draftees were being killed in action or wounded at the rate of 234 per 1,000. Draftee deaths were 31 per 1,000. By contrast, Army enlisted volunteers were killed or wounded at a rate of 137 per 1,000, and 17 per 1,000 died.

Draftees comprised 88 per cent of infantry riflemen in Vietnam last year while first-term Regular Army men comprised 10 per cent of the riflemen. The remaining 2 per cent were career Army men . . .

Previously unavailable draftee casualty statistics reveal that over the five years in which Americans have been in combat in Vietnam, draftee casualties (killed and wounded) have run 130 per 1,000 per year and non-draftee casualties have run 84 per 1,000. The Army General Staff prepared the study at the request of *National Journal* . . .

The disparity between draftee and volunteer casualty rates directly reflects the tasks that the Army assigns each group of soldiers. . . . Three-year volunteers have the option of selecting their Army jobs and four out of five make their own choice. In 1970, less than 3 percent have asked to serve in the infantry . . .

An Army general who has served more than two years in Vietnam and who asked anonymity said: "Given the way draftees are used by the Army, it's quite obvious that they'll take the brunt of the casualties. It's very sad, really. But the whole goddam war is very sad." . . .

—From the *National Journal* by its Congressional correspondent, Andrew J. Glass, put into the Congressional

Record Aug. 21 (p. S13935) by Senator Proxmire, author of a pending amendment to the military authorization bill to stop sending draftees to Southeast Asia. The *National Journal* (\$450 a year, 1730 M St NW, Washington D.C.) specializes in in-depth political research. This information on draftees has long been denied not only to the press but to Congress. A CBS broadcast provides a supplementary glimpse of how regular Army men treat themselves:

This is Long Binh Army Post, 16 miles from Saigon. It's one of the biggest American bases in Vietnam, a city of 26,000 men. One sergeant here told me that being in Long Binh was the next best thing to not being in Vietnam at all. But Long Binh, like the rest of Vietnam, is a combat zone—everyone gets combat pay. You can spend your year in Vietnam at Long Binh with very little feeling of a war going on. These are the air-conditioned soldiers. One colonel, the head of information here, has a staff of 45, three of whom put out the headquarters magazine, called "Up Tight." The colonel admits that his 42 other information personnel have very little to do . . .

Many of the combat companies in Vietnam are 40 men under strength. At Long Binh Post there are units with as many as 400 men over strength. Of more than 400,000 Americans in Vietnam, in all only 75,000 men are considered to be combat troops. A disproportionate number of draftees are engaged in direct combat. In the rifle companies, eight out of ten men are draftees. Long Binh has a disproportionate number of career officers and NCO's.

—Morley Safer, CBS News, Long Binh, July 17.

No Firm Peace Possible Without The Palestinian Arabs

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scheme should not become an open city for Jew and Arab, perhaps some day the joint capital of a Palestinian confederation. The Holy City deserves a solution of imagination and magnanimity. Its present Mayor, Teddy Kolleck, has paved the way by his own liberal and large-minded policies for an evolution of this kind.

A Time Bomb Bound To Explode

The crux of the problem, the key to future peace, lies with the Palestinian Arabs, whether in the occupied territories or in the refugee camps. Unfortunately the Rogers plan does not provide for their representation. Nathan Yalin-Mor, head of the so-called Stern Gang in the Jewish terror against the British in the 1940s, and now one of the leading spokesmen in Israel for Arab-Jewish reconciliation, spoke of this on *Radio Stockholm* Aug. 20. "Without the Palestinians being part of, and partner in, any political settlement, as an autonomous body," Mr. Yalin-Mor said, "no solution will be of lasting value. A new selling out of the Palestinian people would amount to planting a time bomb bound to explode after a few years." Unfortunately, he added, the Arabs in the occupied territories, though they favor Nasser's decision for peace talks, have no representative body. On the other hand those in the refugee camps are under guerrilla leadership which opposed the cease-fire and any kind of compromise. This is the same intransigent and fanatic line which has led Arab resistance into one debacle after another. "The result," Mr. Yalin-Mor said, "may be the same as for the last 50 years: disaster for the Palestinian people and the missing of a promising historical opportunity for national self-determination."

Friends of peace must deeply regret the way in which Mrs. Meir handled questions about the Palestinian Arabs in her appearance on *Face The Nation*. She rejected any idea of talks with them and any responsibility whatsoever for the Arab refugees. She implied that they had only themselves to blame because they had not accepted the 1947 UN partition plan. But how can Mrs. Meir invoke the 1947 partition resolution, the legal basis of Israel's existence, and then ignore the 1948 UN refugee resolution, which is the legal basis of Arab rights to repatriation or compensation?

We know the situation is a complex one for Israel but we wish Mrs. Meir had voiced some sympathy for their plight, some readiness to help, some hope for reconciliation. Her coldness was unworthy of a Jewish leader. It is said that Moses

Israel's Right of Hot Pursuit

Sen. Ribicoff: What if terrorist attacks on Israel mounted from Syria and Jordan continued? Does Israel still retain the legitimate right of self-defense to cross borders to get the attackers who now enjoy the protection of Jordan and Syria?

Sen. Fulbright: First, if Jordan and Syria consented to or harbored this kind of attack, they would be in violation of the Security Council guarantee and I think the Security Council ought to take action. But if they do not, and if the occurrence is a clear violation, Israel of course reserves the right of self-defense if it is attacked. By agreeing to the guarantee and the settlement, they do not give up all rights of self-defense.

Sen. Ribicoff: Suppose Arab attackers flee back to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Does the Senator conceive that Israelis, in hot pursuit, could not cross the borders of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, or Egypt to get to the terrorist bases in those countries?

Sen. Fulbright: If it is hot pursuit, I think they could do that. But here you raise a difficult factual matter. It is not unlike questions which have been raised with us in recent months in Southeast Asia.

This must be judged by rule of reason. If guerrillas are going back and forth across the borders, I think the rule of reason would say, yes, the Israelis could defend themselves, even to the extent of following the guerrillas across the borders. Then, you get to the question: Suppose they go all the way to Amman; suppose they go to the extent of attacking Jordan. That exceeds hot pursuit. They should not be allowed to use hot pursuit as an excuse to occupy Egypt or Jordan; they should not be allowed to go beyond what a reasonable man would say was repelling an attack.

—In the Senate, August 24.

kept the Jews 40 years in the desert to purge them of the habits acquired in slavery. Leadership, like hers, in 40 years of siege and war, will purge the Jews of the compassion acquired in Exile. While the Palestinian Arabs are beginning in their homelessness to talk like Jews in a new Diaspora*, the Israeli leadership is beginning to sound more and more like unfeeling *goyim*. This reversal of roles is the cruellest prank God ever played on His Chosen People.

* See the burning eloquence of the article by F. Turki, a Palestinian Arab, in the Aug. 10 *Paris Herald-Tribune*.

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